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Researchers and financial economists have for long identified that bank managers use loan loss provisions 
which is a substantial accrual in the banking industry to manage reported earnings in line with the prediction of 
the agency theory. In Nigeria, this practice remains a mere theoretical insinuation because there are hardly any 
empirically documented evidences to support the assertion. In order to fill this void in literature, the present study 
explores the relationship between loan loss provision and earnings management in Nigerian DMBs. Secondary 
data were obtained from the 8 banks’ annual reports for the period of 2006 to 2011 and robust regression was 
used as a tool for data analysis. The result indicates that there is a positive relationship between the provision for 
loan losses and earnings management in Nigerian DMBs. It is therefore, recommended that, if emphasis is on 
the integrity of financial reports, regulators should put a ceiling on the provision for loan losses rather than 
leaving it at the total discretion of managers who provide it to suit their selfish interest. 
 





The use of loan loss provision to manipulate reported earnings have been widely discussed in the literature 
particularly in the light of developed countries. Different reasons for it have been proferred by researchers 
including capital market incentives, contracts motivation and regulation motivation. In this regard, Chang, 
Shen and Fang (2008) note that bank managers use discretion regarding loan loss allowance to manage 
earnings. The basic argument is that since it is replenished by a charge to earnings and the credit quality of 
the loan portfolio cannot be determined precisely by objective criteria, the allowance for loan losses has been 
shown potentially as a means to manage earnings (Grey and Clarke, 2004). Thus, from the regulators’ point 
of view, the emphasis is on whether loan loss estimation truly reflects the prevailing economic conditions of 
the firm. The question is how adequate is the provision in covering the expected credit losses over the 
lifespan of the loan?  
Atleast three philosophies surround the discussion on loan loss provisioning in the banking industry. In 
a review of theoretical and empirical evidence regarding the estimation for loan losses, Wall and Koch(2000) 
note that the philosophies include economists’ view, FASB’s view and the capital view. While the economists 
view loan loss allowance as the provision that is intended to capture expected future losses should the 
borrower fails to pay his obligation as at when due, the FASB’s view is concerned with the measurement of a 
firm’s net income over a given period of time. The last view sees loan loss allowance as a form of capital to 
be accumulated in good times to absorb losses during bad time. Wall and Koch (2000) further note that the 
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philosophy from which the provision is viewed depends on the researcher’s intention. But regardless of the 
motivation and the philosophy, the behaviour for earnings management implies conflict of interest between 
managers, owners and minority shareholders. 
Like most industries the worldover, the Nigerian banking industry is going through tough times with the 
recent financial crises which saw a collapse of some banks such as Oceanic Bank and Intercontinental Bank 
which were eventually acquired by other banks. This, among other things led to the challenge of the 
governance practice of the Deposit Money Banks (DMBs) in Nigeria. The introduction of new codes of 
governance practices by the CBN in 2003 and its constant modifications are all in the interest of effective 
monitoring to allign the interest of shareholders with that of managers. Because it was generally observed 
that undesirable banking practices such as poor risk diversification, inadequate loan evaluation, fraudulent 
activities were as much responsible as other macroeconomic factors in causing baking crises that shook the 
financial systems of nations (Arun and Reaz, 2005). Inadequate provisions for loan losses thus served as a 
major tool used by managers during these crises to cancel true firms economic conditions of their banks.  
The reason why banks manipulate earnings is supported by three arguments: signalling argument, 
income smoothing or earnings management argument and capital management argument (Zhou and Chen, 
2004). The signalling argument suggests that banks use discretionary loan loss provision to insinuate that 
earnings will be high in subsequent periods (Wahlen, 1994: Liu and Ryan, 1995: Beaver and Engel, 1996). 
Contrary to the signalling argument, earnings management argument holds that managers increase the 
provision for loan losses in periods when earnings are high, under the assumption of income smoothing 
(Beatty, Chamberlain & Mogliolo, 1995: Collins, Shackleford & Wahlen, 1995: Rivard, Bland & morris, 2003). 
This implies that earnings management in this area can improve a bank’s cash flows, capital adequacy, 
market value and overall performance. While the capital management argument suggests that since increase 
in loan loss provision increases regulatory capital, management exercises discretion over its provision 
(Ahmed, et al., 1999: Beatty et al., 1995). Regardless of the industry and the strings attached, managers’ 
discretionary behaviour to achieve personal gains undermines the shareholders’ wealth maximization 
objective of the firm. 
Empirical evidences in this field of research are characterized by conflicting findings. Ma (1988), 
Anandrajan, Hassan and McCarthy (2006) both find that loan loss allowance are used for earnings 
management in samples of U.S. banks. Also Rivard et al. (2003) and Perez, Fumas and Saurina (2006) find 
that there is positive interraction between the provision for loan losses in U.S. and Spanish banks 
respectively. However, Beatty et al. (1995) find little statistical relationship between loan loss provisions and 
earnings management. Moreso, Ahmed et al (1999) fail to document robust relationship between loan loss 
provision and opportunistic accounting but still they conclude that loan loss provisions reflect meaningful 
changes in the expected quality of banks’ loan portfolios. These differences in findings between studies are 
due to different sample selections and the use of different time periods being examined. Wall and Koch 
(2000) conclude though that the available evidence clearly suggests that banks have an incentive to use loan 
loss accounting to help manage reported earnings. 
A considerable number of studies explored the relationship between loan loss allowance and earnings 
management in the developed countries. However, the attention on developing nations whose economies are 
rapidly growing and have peculiar corporate control features, capital allocation and regulations have only 
recently gathered momentum (Bradbury, Mark and Tan, 2006). The differences in economies and level of 
sophisticatication of regulatory authorities accross the globe call for such investigations in the Nigerian 
context. Moreso, the existing literature do not yield a conclusive results as conflicting findings trail these 
studies. 
The objective of this work, therefore, is to investigate the relationship between loan loss provisions and 
earnings management in DMBs in Nigeria. To achieve this aim, it is therefore hypothesized that there is no 
significant relationship between loan loss provisions and earnings management in DMBs in Nigeria. The 
contribution of this work is in two ways. Firstly, it adds to the extant literaure that examined the interraction 
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between loan loss provisions and earnings management. Secondly, given that almost all the works in this 
area are focused on samples of developed economies like the U.S. and Australia, this study therefore 
extends these research phenomena in the context of emerging economies like Nigeria.  
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. Section two reviews emperical works that are 
related to this study and presents the theoretical framework. Methodological issues are raised and discussed 
in section three and the model is specified. In section four results are presented and major findings are 
discussed together with their policy implications. Finally, in section five the work is concluded and 
recommendations are poferred in the light of major findings. 
 
2. Theory and Evidence 
 
In this section, we review existing literature that relates to the present study in order to give a bird’s eye view 
on the concept of earnings management through the use of loan loss provision which is a substantial accrual 
in the banking industry. 
 
2.1 Earnings Management 
 
There is no single universally accepted definition of earnings management (also called creative accounting) 
in the literature. According to Barnea, Ronen and Sadan (1976) earnings management, is the deliberate 
dampening of fluctuations about “some level of earnings considered to be normal for the firm”. In the words of 
Schipper (1989:92), “By earnings management I really mean ‘disclosure management’ in the sense of a 
purposeful intervention in the external financial reporting process, with a view to obtaining private gain for 
shareholders or managers”. Thus, simply put, earnings management is the deliberate intervention in financial 
reporting process to achieve personal goals. The definition is important and it encapsulates all aspects of 
earnings management because it acknowledges that any attempt to temper with financial reporting process 
in order to intentionally change its true picture is what constitute earnings management. 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) define earnings management as the altering of financial statements through 
the use of judgement in structuring transactions to either mislead the firm’s stakeholders about the true 
economic picture of the firm or to achieve some contractual benefit that is based on accounting numbers. 
This means that earnings management is the manipulation of financial statement by managers, using 
accounting choices, estimates and methods, to achieve some objectives that are largely in conflict with the 
underlying economic status of the firm. 
Various methods for the detection of earnings management have been documented. “Empirical studies 
have found managers engage in earnings management through changing accounting choice, real 
transactions, total accruals/discretionary accruals, specific accruals, earnings distributions approach and 
income smoothing” (Sun and Rath, 2010, p122). Of all these methods, the total accruals approach seems to 
be the one that has caught the attention of researchers the most. This is due to the fact that it is the most 
damaging to the usefulness of accounting information because investors are wary of such accruals (Al-
Fayoumi, Abuzayed and Alexander, 2010).  
Different incentives to manage earnings are widely discussed in the literature. Bhat (1996), linked it to 
the attempt to enhance shareholders’ value and to maximize executive compensation through income 
smoothing and earnings management respectively. Income smoothing, occassional big bath, living for today 
and maximization of variability are identified by Wall and Koch (2000). Chang et al. (2008) note three 
incetives to manage earnings. Firstly, because of capital market motivation, which includes initial public 
offerings, seasoned equity offerings, management buoyant plans and plans for mergers to meet earnings 
forecast, to smooth earnings, etc. Secondly, contracts motivation such as management compensation, debt 
agreement or job security also constitute the incentive for earnings management. Thirdly, laws and 
regulations such as import regulation, industrial regulation, antitrust laws, e.t.c., also can serve as incentives. 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 17 
July 2014 
          
 52 
Most recently, Cornett et al. (2009), note that managers use discretionary accruals for opportunistic 
earnings mangement. This includes options (the incentive for bonus income by attaining some level of 
performance) and affecting stock prices to enhance managers’wealth through restricted stock compensation. 
The use of discretion by managers to target bonus plans was first documented by Healy (1985). 
 
2.2 Loan Loss Provisions and Earnings Management 
 
Considerable speculation about the provision of large loan losses to influence earnings sprang in the early 
1980s when it was revealed that U.S. banks provided inadequate loan losses to understate net assets and 
profits (Grey and Clarke 2004). Prior to that, Hepworth (1953) acknowledged that firms manage income for 
tax purposes, shareholders confidence and expectations that are likely to accompany the report of high 
earnings. But the attention on the use of discretion to manage earnings received global impetus after the 
Enron crises and many other similar cases that followed. The central theme among the companies that were 
affected both in the U.S. and other parts of the world was financial irregularities, which reiterated the need for 
better grasp of earnings management among pratcitioners, regulators and those in the academia. Previous 
studies have identified that loan losses is one of the major causes of these financial crises and its provision 
has a direct impact on firms’ cash flows and consequantly the reported earnings (e.g Chang et al. 2008 and 
Mohammad et al. 2011). 
Loan loss provision is an expense on the income statement which signifies managers’ assessment of 
expected future losses. This means that an increase in loan loss provision reduces net income, while a fall in 
loan losses increases net income. Since it is the result of managers’ assessment of the likely loss that the 
company would incur should the borrower fail to repay his obligations as at when due, the provision for it is 
considered to have two (2) portions: non-discretionary and discretionary portions. “Non-discretionary is a 
function of specific quality determinants in the loan portfolio- non-accrual loans, renegotiated loans, loans 
past due over 90 days, specific analyses on troubled large credits, usually implying internal grading system” 
(Grey and Clarke 2004: 323). The non-discretionary portion, therefore, is the provision that is based on fair 
and objective analysis of the firm’s economic conditions.  
While the discretionary portion are those accruals that largely depend on the outcome of the managers’ 
future expectation of uncertain events (Mohammad et al. 2011). The components of it are both quantitative 
and qualitative. Grey and Clarke (2004: 323) point that the qualitative components include political, 
economic, geographical and political factors, while the quantitative are “statistical analysis of loans not 
individually analyzed for special reserve and therefore are largely at the discretion of managers”. 
In their review of earnings management research, Sun and Rath (2010) note that the arguments that 
support the use of specific accrual (e.g loan loss provision) to detect earnings management is proferred by 
McNichols (2000: 126) who summarizes its advantages into two. “First, this approach enables researchers to 
develop intuition for the key factors that influence the behaviour of the accrual. Second, the approach can be 
applied in industries in which a certain type of business can result in a specific accrual being material”. He 
further notes that the problems attributed with measuring earnings management through specific accruals do 
not affect banks and insurance because some particular accruals accounts (loan loss provision in the case of 
banks) are very material due to the peculiar nature of the business. Therefore, since it constitutes large 
accruals for banks and since its provision has a significant impact on earnings, loan loss provision is an 
important tool for earnings management in banking sector. 
The use of loan loss provision to manipulate earnings has been emperically reported in the literature. 
Anandrajan et al. (2006) find that banks in Australia use loan loss provisions to manage earnings. Their result 
suggest commercial banks engage more aggressively in the earnings management practice than unlisted 
commercial banks. conflicting. Ma (1988) examines if loan loss provisions were used as a tool for income 
smoothing in banks. He concludes that together with loan charge-offs it is used reduce volatility of earnings 
by banks. 
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Rivard et al. (2003) investigate the income smoothing behaviour of banks in the U.S. under revised 
international capital requirement. They revised the income smoothing practice using post Basel Accord data. 
The evidence from the study confirms the existence of income smoothing and extends the proposition that 
banks have become more aggressive in using loan loss provision as a tool for earnings management. 
Perez et al. (2006) explore earnings and capital management in alternative loan loss provision 
regulatory regimes. Using sample of Spanish banks and panel data econometric techniques, the study 
documents that loan loss provisioning is used as a tool for earnings management. Regarding, capital 
management, however, a robust relationship is not documented. They conclude that the introduction of IFRS 
in Europe does not prevent managers from decreasing earnings volatility. Similarly, Oosterbosch (2009) tests 
the effect of IFRS implemetation on discretionary use of loan loss provision. Using a sample of European 
banks and single stage regression, evidence suggests that detailed disclosure requirements regarding loan 
loss accounting do not deter bank managers from using the provision for loan losses to their discretion for 
income smoothing. 
Collins et al. (1995) investigates whether, in addition to the provision for loan losses, other tools such 
as loan charge-offs and securities issuances were used for earnings management. They document a positive 
association only between loan loss provisions and earnings management, and conclude that the other tools 
were used primarily for capital management. Looking at the special characteristics of those banks that 
engage in opportunistic accounting through the use of loan loss provisions, Greenawalt and Sinkey (1988) 
find that regional banks engaged in more aggressive income smoothing than money-centred banks. Bhat 
(1996) establishes that banks that engaged in aggressive income smoothing were in poorer financial health 
relative to others. 
However, there are other studies fail to find a robust association between loan loss provisions and 
earnings manipulations. They include Beatty et al. (1995) and Ahmed et al. (1999). Anandrajan et al. (2006) 
note that their finding of no association was surprising, since the capital adequacy regulation removed the 
costs of earnings management. They attribute the differences in results to difference in model specification. 
For capital management and income smoothing, the use of loan loss provision has also been 
emperically tested. Liu and Ryan (1995) conclude that increases in loan loss provisions are good news only 
for banks that the market perceives to have loan default problems; if prognosis is already good, no significant 
stock market reaction occurs. Beaver and Engel (1996) document that increases in the discretionary 
component of loan loss provision are viewed as good news items. Also, Moyer (1990) find that banks used 
provisions for loan losses by inflating loan loss reserves when capital levels were close to violating minimum 
capital regulations. However, they did not find significant association with other tools, such as charge-offs. 
In another context, Bushman and Williams (2011) examine the triangular relationship between 
accounting discretion, loan loss provision and discipline of banks’ risk-taking. Their sample consists of large 
banks from 27 countries. They find, among other things, that discretionary provisioning in the form of 
earnings smoothing dampens disciplinary pressure on risk-taking, consistent with the assumption that 
smoothing reduces bank transparency and inhibits monitoring by outsiders. 
From the above discussion, it is evident that the use of loan loss provision to manipulate financial 
reports has gained the attention of researchers lately. Although, these evidences are drawn from the 
emperical results of the developed countries, the practice of the banks worldwide are similar. Loan loss 
provisions, thus constitute significant accrual that is potentially used as a tool for earnings manipulation in the 
industry. 
Agency theory provides natural backdrop upon which this research is based. This is because of its 
relevance in proferring solution to agency problems that characterize the modern day businesses. The theory 
predicts that in the presence of information asymetry, the manager is exposed to some privilege information 
regarding the firm, a situation which induces opportunistic tendencies. Lambert (1984) as cited in Rivard et al. 
(2003) notes that earnings management can arise solely as a natural byproduct of the agency relationship. It 
is optimal for the principal to pick a contract which motivates to smooth the reported earnings over time. 
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Earnings management, therefore arises as an optimal equilibrium behavior in the agency setting. 
 
3. Methodology and Model Specification 
 
This work is a correlational research that attempts to link loan loss provisions with earnings management. As 
the first step in establishing relationships, a correlational study measures the association or variability of two 
or more variables. The population consists of all 18 DMBs listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) as at 
31st December, 2011 while the sample consists of 8 banks whose data for the study period, which is 2007 to 
2011 are available. Thus, we have pooled panel data of 40 firm-year observations. This period is relevant as 
it is considered as the height of financial crises in recent times and inadequate provisions for loan losses has 
been identified as one of the factors that led to the collapse of quite a number of corporations. The study 
uses secondary data only as a method of data collection while OLS multiple regression (robust) is used as a 
tool for analysis. The robust regression automatically tackles heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
Various models have been advanced by researchers in identifying the accruals that is discretionary in 
the banking sector. Most of these models largely emanate from McNichols and Wilson (1988) who used 
estimated residuals of bad debts regression model as a surrogate of discretionary accruals. This approach is 
known as the specific accruals method, which focuses on specific industries such as banks and insurance 
firms and use knowledge of institutional arrangements to characterize the likely nondiscretionary behaviour of 
accruals.  
The aim of discretionary accruals models is to segment total accruals into discretionary and 
nondiscretionary components. Consitent with McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Chang et al. (2008), a cross-
sectional regression of loan loss provision (as the explained variable) is run against loans outstanding at the 
beginning of the year and loan charge-offs for that year (explanatory variables). The difference between the 
error term, on one hand and total loan loss provision, beginning balance for loan losses, on the other, will be 
used to estimate for the discretionary loan loss provision for each year. The result obtained will in turn be 
used in the second model as the dependent variable.  
Loan loss provisions (LLP) is defined as the sum of the ending balance of allowance for bad and 
doubtful debts and loan charge-offs, then deducting the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts (Chang 
et al., 2008). The reason for the inclusion of beginning balance of total loan losses is due to the fact that it 
arises from past accumulations and serves as an inventory in setting the current loan loss allowance level. 
Mathematically, it is expressed as follows: 
       (i) 
The intuition underlying the choice of these variables is that “in practice most bank managers decide 
the amount of loan loss provisions every month according to individual risk assessment on potential 
uncollectible loans and loans write-offs.” (Chang et al., 2008:13). Since discretionary accruals can not be 
observed directly, it is estimated by regressing loan loss provision on the independent variables in equation 
(ii). The discretionary loan loss provision is the error term which is the difference between loan loss provision, 
on the one hand and loan charge-offs for the year and the beginning balance of loan losses, on the other. All 
variables are scaled by the beginning balance of total assets to mitigate spurious size effects in the 
explanation of provisions. The regression equation, therefore is as follows: 
   (ii) 
Where:  LLP = Loan Loss Provision for firm i at time t. 
LCO = the Loan Charge-offs for firm i at time t. 
BBAL = the beginning balance of LLP for firm i at time t. 
TA = the beginning total asset of firm i at time t. 
İ = the error term 
Į0 = the intercept. 
),( BBALLCOfLLP =
itititti TABBALTALCOTATALLP εααα +++= −−−− 1211101 ///1/
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Į1 and Į2 are parameter estimates of the variables. 
Earnings management is the residual of the regression from equation (ii). 
  (iii) 
The higher the value of the /DLLP/, the higher the present of earnings manipulation via loan loss 
provision. This research focuses on absolute DLLP rather than the signed values of the accruals because the 
interest is on the magnitude rather than the direction of the accruals. The signed value only gives an insight 
into whether earnings are being managed upwards or downwards. 
To test the study hypothesis, consistent with Grey and Clark (2004) and Chang et al. (2008), wmodel 
discretionary loan loss provision ሺܦܮܮܲሻ which is also referred to as earnings management as a function of 
loan loss provision ሺܮܮܲሻ, Change in non-performing loans (οܰܲܮሻ and bank size which is proxy by natural 
log of total asset (lnTA). Both Change in non-performing loans and bank size are included in the model as 
control variables. 
ܦܮܮܲ ൌ ݂ሺܮܮܲǡ οܰܲܮǡ ݈݊ܶܣሻ     (iv) 
The intuition underlying the choice of these variables is that “in practice most bank managers decide 
the amount of loan loss provisions every month according to individual risk assessment on potential 
uncollectible loans and loans write-offs.” (Chang et al., 2008:13). In order to mitigate the possibility of 
spurious data that may result if the discretionary accruals is taken in its raw form, the study uses lagged total 
assets to scale all the variables. This approach is consistent with Sarkar, Sarkar and Sen (2006) and Al-
Fayoumi et al. (2010). The model of the study is therefore specified as follows: 
ܦܮܮ ௜ܲ௧ ൌ ܽ଴ ൅ ܽଵܮܮ ௜ܲ௧ ൅ ܽଶ߂ܰܲܮ௜௧ ൅ ܽଷ݈݊ܶܣ௜௧ ൅ ߝ௜௧   (v) 
 
4. Result and Discussion 
 
In this section, the study results are presented and discussed. A set of descriptive statistics are first 
presented, then followed by the regression result. 
 
Table 1: Summary of Descriptive Statistics. 
 
DLLP LLP ǻNPL lnTA 
Mean .0116293 .008585 .0265455 80.3 
Std. Dev. .033437 .0153452 .0432047 65.772 
Minimum -.1795355 0 .00169 25 
Maximum .0957049 .0793218 .277709 27500 
Observation 48 48 48 48 
 
Source: Output of summary statistics obtained from Stata 9 
 
Table 1 above reveals average DLLP of 1% of total lagged asset of the sample banks with a standard 
deviation of .03. The minimum is -.18 while the maximum is .09. Average LLP is approximately 1%, the 
standard deviation is .01 and lying between 0 and 7%. ǻNPL has a mean of 3% and the standard deviation is 
.04 and the minimum and maximum are .01% and 27 percent respectively. lnTA averages 80.3 billion Naira 
revealing that Nigerian banks are large in terms of capital base. There is a wide gap accross the industry 
regarding bank size as the minimum is 25 billion Naira while the maximum is as high as 2.75 trillion. This is 
reflected in the wide difference between the mean (80 billion) and the standard deviation, which is 65 billion 
Naira. The standard deviations of LLP and ǻNPL are relatively large which implies different level of pressure 
bornes by individual banks. It is worthy of note that the averages of the variables do not differ substantially 
from their respective standard deviations which means that the data are not skewed and are fit to produce a 
reliable result. 
[ ]12111011 ///1// −−−−− +−= ttttttitti TABBALTALCOTATALLPTADLLP ααα
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix Table 
 
DLLP LLP ǻNPL lnTA
DLLP 1.000
LLP 0.3628 1.000
ǻNPL -0.2648 0.2794 1.000
lnTA 0.7645 0.0653 -0.7521 1.000
 
Source: Output of Correlation Matrix obtained from Stata 9. 
 
Correlation matrix shows the relationship between explanatory variables and explained variable and also the 
relationship among the individual variables themselves. The result indicates that apart from ǻNPL all 
independent variables revealed a positive interraction with the dependent variable. This is enough to infer 
that variables are well selected and they explain the dependent variable strongly. The result calls for a 
verification as to whether only LLP and lnTA impact on DLLP in Nigerian DMBs by regressing only the 
variables on the regressor. However, the result shows a lower R-square Adjusted suggesting that the extend 
to which the two variables together explain the dependent variables is more than when they are taken 
seperately. The result is not shown for brevity.  
The correlation matrix is an alternative test for multicollinearity. Gujarati (2004) notes that correlation 
above 0.8 between variables is a concern as it indicates excessive correlation. From the correlation table, the 
results reveal only a mild correlation among the independent variables which indicates that the model 
performs well. 
 
Table 3: Regression Result 
 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t Prob
Intercept .0427109 .0480161 0.81 .0379
LLP .8478068 .142384 5.95 0.000
ǻNPL -.1889831 .0765496 -2.47 0.018
lnTA .4152929 .0605093 6.86 0.000
Adj.R-Square 0.8609
F. 47.08
Prob. of F. 0.0000
 
Source: Regression output from Stata 9 
 
Table 3 above reveals that there is a positive relationship between DLLP and LLP having coefficient of 0.84 
with a t-value of 5.95 and significant at 1% indicating. This implies that 1% increase in LLP leads to 8% 
increase in earnings management. The result indicates that banks plan to maintain almost the same 
percentage of LLP during the sample period. ǻNPL and DLLP exhibit an inverse interaction which is 
significcant at 5% and having coefficient of -0.18 and t-value of -2.47 which signifies 1% increase in the 
ǻNPL results to a fall in earnings management by 2%. The result also reveals a positive relationship between 
DLLP and lnTA having a coefficient of 0.41 and a t-value of 6.86 and significant at 1% implying that 1% rise 
in bank size results in rise of earnings management by 4%. 
From the results, the positive association between earnings management (DLLP) and LLP suggests 
that banks increase provision for loan losses to manage (smooth earnings). However this management is not 
indicated whether upward or downward (income-increasing or income-decreasing) because the study adopts 
the absolute DLLP rather than the signed values. Also, the positive relationship between earnings 
management and ǻNPL suggests that as the amount of non-performing loan increases, bank managers may 
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increase the provision for loan losses in order to reduce the ratio of non-performing loans. The result of this 
study is in line with the findings of Collins et al. (1995), Greenwalt and Sinkey (1988), Bhat (1996), Rivard et 
al. (2003) and Chang et al. (2008). While it contradicts the findings of Moyer (1990), Beatty et al. (1995) 
Ahmed et al. (1999) and Anandrajan et al. (2006). Conclusively, it is documented in this study that bank 
managers intend to use discretionary loan loss provisions to influence reported earnings when they have high 
loan loss provisions or high non-performing loans. Thus, the earlier conjecture that there is no relationship 
between loan loss provision and earnings management in Nigerian DMBs is rejected. 
The control variable positively relates with earnings management. This opposes the view that because 
large banks have more resources than their smaller counterparts they are more likely to avoid the use of loan 
loss provision to manipulate reported earnings. On the contrary, perhaps because of the pressure exerted on 
large banks by their stakeholders, banks have incentive to manage earnings to please their complex 
stakeholders. 
Overall, the aggregate influence of the explanatory variables included in the model are able to explain 
DLLP up to 86% which is indicated by R-square (overall), while the remaining 14% are controlled by other 
factors that are not included in the model. The F-Statisctics of 47.08 and significant at better than 1% shows 
that the model is well fitted and therefore provides substantial evidence that loan loss provision is positively 
related with earnings management in DMBs in Nigeria. 
 
5. Conclusion and Recommendation 
 
The purpose of loan loss provisions is to adjust banks’ loan loss reserves to reflect expected future losses on 
their loan portfolios. Bank managers have an incentive to smooth earnings through the discretionary part of 
the allowance for loan losses because less volatility in earnings is a fundamental foundation for stable stock 
prices. The manipulation of earnings is made possible by the existence of information asymetry provided by 
the agency relationship that exists between managers and shareholders of modern day corporations. 
Empirical studies that explored the realtionship between loan loss provisions and manipulation of earnings in 
Nigeria is almost non-existent thus it is not known with certainty whether the theoretical insinuation that bank 
managers use the provision for loan losses to manage earnings holds water. In this study, it is documented 
that earnings management is positively related with loan loss provision in DMBs in Nigeria. It is therefore 
recommended that regulatory authorities such as CBN and SEC should place a provision ceiling regarding 
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